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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEE C. FELT, a/k/a
Lee Craig Felt,
Pl azn
. t"ff
A
ll t
i - ppe am ,
vs.

I
'

Case No.
12409

ROBERT S. FELT,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff wife appeals from Order Reducing Alimony.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The Court, on defendant-husband's Motion and
three day hearing reduced alimony from $1,000.00 per
month to $1.00 per year.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Parties were married Dec. 17, 1949 and were di.
vorced May 17, 1967 without having had children.
Property, including home, automobiles, stock, bonds
and bank accounts were split down the middle, and defendant-husband, by stipulated settlement, was ordered
to pay $1,000.00 per month alimony. The Decree was
adorned with language purporting to forever divest the
Court of Review.
" . . . and that said amount shall not hereafter
be adjusted, notwithstanding increases or de·
creases in any amount in the income of plaintiff,
and notwithstanding any changes in the income
of the defendant unless said changes are sub·
stantial and so decrease the defendant's income
so the defendant is reasonably unable to pay the
alimony agreed to herein." AR p. 11.
Defendant-husband later complained the Stipula·
tion and Decree was unreasonable and that he signed
while under mental and physical duressA. (by Dr. Felt) All I can say at this time, I was
under enough mental and physical duress,
as Mr. Burton indicates, so as to sign and not
to contest this is being in fact the best that
my counsel, who I felt to be skilled and pro·
fessional, could secure. And although I qu~s·
tioned that, as well as other portions wh1cn
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haven't been alluded to yet, I was told and
assured that in view of discussions through
the counsels that this was proper and that I
should therefore sign. ( R-373, L 30).

*

*

*

*

*

*

A. (Dr. Felt) The substance was, well, any
Third District Court Judge would agree that
this was fair and equitable and so 1 think it
is too. ( R 373, line 27.
Q. So you really weren't prevailed upon in any
manner to sign this agreement rather than
not to sign it?

A. (Dr. Felt) Only to the extent that was the
best we could do, therefore, ergo, write your
name, the answer was always the same, well,
there it is. (R 375, L 22).
At the time of marriage, defendant-husband had a
medical doctor's education substantially completed by
the winter they were married, 1949.

Q. And so, except for the one quarter and wind-

ing up ceremonies, he had completed his medical education when you and he were married?

A. (Mrs. Felt) He had completed his M.D. He
had not completed his medical education.
Q. He had not completed his residency nor internship, you mean?
A. That's correct.
The alimony settlemen tindicated court and counsel
mistakenly thought she had put him through college,
the alimony settlement reading-
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"The amount of the aforesaid alimony for tli
s1:1pport of Lee C. Felt is a reasonable sum i;
view of the. eff o~·ts made
plaintiff in assisting
defendant m his profess10nal education .. , ·
AR p. 11.

?Y

whereas his family put him through school which she
admittedQ .... You really didn't assist him in his basic
education at all, did you?

A. (Mrs. Felt) 'Vhen he was in college, I dia
not. (R 316, L 8).
Q. Who paid for your medical education?

A. (Dr. Felt) My parents. (R-325, L 21).
His parents provided an automobile as wellQ. Besides that, your parents bought you an
automobile?

A. (Dr. Felt) Yes, they did. (R-409, L 25),
and provided them with a duplex ( R-318, L 6) without
down payment (R-318, L 16).
Plaintiff-wife had a bachelor's degree in arts at
the time of marriage (R-289, L 8). She contributed
modestly to family income while defendant-husband in·
terned.
At the time of the diYorce ( 1967) defendant-hus·
band earned substantially as an eye surgeon and she
modestly, with intermittent parttime work and defend·
ant was "suffering and continues to suffer serious health
problems as a result of the emotional involvements and
4

disturbances connected with the divorce matters and
proceedings herein. (AR p. 18.)
At the time of Motion for Modification ( 1969),
plaintiff-appellant-wife was in excellent and vigorous
health-

Q. You are in vigorous health, are you not?
A. Yes, I am. )R-291, L 4);

plays tennis, golf and skates and skis (R-290, L 29),
was socially prominent (R-291, L 7), without dependents (R-291, L 16), had income from several sources,
(R-296, L 10)Q. So that year of 1968 you had income from
the Southeast Furniture, and from Circuit
and Eddington and from Cottonwood Mall
and you had the alimony and the KUTV?

A. (Mrs. Felt) Yef!.
Her salary alone was $8,091. Income from other sources
$12,078.00; total for 1968, $20,968.00 ( R-296, L 16) ;
1969 salary without alimony, $8,500.00 or $8,600.00
(R-297, L 25).
Plaintiff-wife, after the divorce, voluntarily placed
herself in the labor market despite $1,000.00 a month
alimony coming in (R-301, L 26 to 30) earning over
$9,000.00 in 1969 (R-302, L 2), and besides her salaried
job, did freelance work on the side ( R-287, L 21) in
the advertiisng business, did consultant work in addition
for a television station in which she had acquired an
ownership interest (R-287, L 26), realized income from
5

stocks and bonds in addition ( R-288, L 14), was acquir.
ing a condominium unit (R-282, L 23), enjoyed medical
and vaaction benefits in connection with her work (R
291, L 30) also paid club membership (R-282, L a1,
had obtained "extensive training in the radio and TY
field" ( R-289, L 10), was admittedly able to earn a
livelihood ... " ( R-289, L 13) and was voluntarily far
from dependentQ. Let's talk about the present. You have chosen
to become a self-employed, highly professional individual, haven't you?

A. (Mrs. Felt) Yes. (R-289, L 22)
and admittedly clung to the alimony to provide for the
rainy day or "security" (R-301, Ll2)So I need this money to try to provide for some
kind of security if I am an in accident, or if 1
am out of work for a short amount of time, or
even a long amount of itme . . " (R-301~ Lll).
Her voluntary departure from dependency rolls is
illustrated in other testimony-

Q. The fact remains that in 1968 you volun·

tarily worked in spite of $1,000.00 a month
coming in?
A. I want to get enough ahead that we can for·
get this. (R-301, L 26)
Q. In 1969 you voluntarily worked. Did I say
$7 ,000 odd dollars coming more? ~ore money
than most girls working in the busmess world
earned? You voluntarily worked and earned
another $9,000.00 didn't you?
A. Yes. (R-302, L 1)
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The settlement left her with $10,000.00 or so plus
home equity, (R-220, L 4) (R-219, L 18).
In connection with the wife's rainy day theory, it is
notable she wound up with a $50,000.00 life insurance
policy on his life, doubple indemnity (AR page 6) and
thereafter sought and obtained another $60,000.00
double indemnity policy on defendant's life. ( R-210).

Q. (By Mr. Hunt) Is it double indemnity on
those?

MR. BURTON: If you know.

A. Yes.
Q. On both of them?

A. I believe so.
Q. So they would pay $200,000.00 in the event
of his death?

MR. BURTON: By accident.
To enhance entitlement position, plaintiff-wife testified she had remained childless but the evidence
showed she had acquiesced in his sterilization to prevent
pregnancy because of hereditary muscular dystrophy
(R-387, L 27), plaintiff knowing this before marriageQ. Did you and she discuss this?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Was she in favor of it?
A. Definitely.
Q. It was a matter that could have a risk that
could have been run by both of you, could
it not?

7

..

Q. You and she may have had children and hare
ru~ the ~isk one way or the other of the chilu
bemg disabled or defective?
A. That's correct.
Q. And did she help you make this decision?
A. Yes. ( R-388, L 18)

And apparently adoption was not considered in the
early stages of the marriage ( R-388, L 20) , only 8 or
so years later, (R-388, L 27) and only after the marriage was already on the rocks. (R-389, L 24). She
earlier testified:

Q. The Court: Had the difficulty been rather
long and extended?
A. (Mrs. Felt) It's been, I think this is some·
thing I should have done ten years ago but
I kept trying and trying until obviously there
was nothing left. (R-22, L 1)
Defendant-respondent-husband, with generous legal
assistance, paid substantially the sums ordered until
health problemsA. Health problem was a compression syndrome
resulting in a partial paralysis of the right
shoulder. (R-378, L 3)
and neurological problems (R-331, L 15) prompted
him to seek medical advise from two doctors (R-331,
L 17) and (R-332, L 1), Dr. Robert Jones and Dr.
W. Spence, defendant testifying that" It became simply mentally and physically im·
possible to maintain this kind of burden on my·
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self, or, to say t~e lea~t, of my dependents or, in
fact, on my patients. (R-330, L 7)
Defendant fell behind on the alimony, sought relief
in Court and testifiedA. In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain
such an alimony figure. (R-329, L 22)

*

*

*

Q. And what else?
A. And although I managed to maintain these

alimony payments as long as I could during
1968, it became simply physically and mentally impossible to maintain this kind of burden on myself, or to say the least, of my dependents, or in fact, on my patients.

Q. Why?

A. Because the overhead costs and business costs
associated with running my practice were
continually on the inflationary rise; although
my fee structure had remained, and still has
remained, the same for about 14 years. And
yet, in order to accomplish this alimony fee,
it was necessary during the latter part of
'68-excuse me-of '67 and early part of
'68 to in effect, rush through more people,
work longer, maintain a heavier surgical
schedule, if possible, in order to meet this
figure. Now this was difficult to do, and
several effects manifested themselves hv this
action. First of all, patients who wer~ not
used to being rushed through in half the time
would remark, at least to me or at least to
my girl . . (R-330, L 24)

*

*

*
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THE COURT: Yes. You can state it.
A. I am not quo~ing necessarily, but people, ot
course, who did feel inclined to comment le!:
the impression that this was becoming a fat:
tory, and maybe it was the work hours wen
somewhat longer with shorter lunches. Thl
surgical schedule was more crowded, an~
when I got home at night, I was so tired, an~
I mean it, that I fell in front of the dinner
table, and then, from there into bed, kicking
everything along the way. I didn't have to
be told that a fuse was going to be blown
one of these days, and finally, it was. Ana
later that year, in spite of this type of a
schedule, as you know, I developed some neurological problems.
Q. Did you actually consult doctors regarding
those?

A. I consulted two physicians, and on their advice, was instructed-there were a few par·
ticular measures which I followed, but in
addition ,was told simply that this sort of
stuff has got to be stopped, and it was. And
it still is.
Q. And were there any instructions, medically,
with respect to the-you say, this sort of
stuff. You have got to tell me more what you
mean by this sort of stuff.

A. I knew by mid-1969 that this schedulethis work load, and this burden, whatever you
want to call it, was not going to work. Now,
as I said, the reason was because of the way
I performed, the way it was affecting othe~
people. They were not used to this kind ol
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rushing, so I really did not have to be told to
slow down, but it finally came to that.

Q. Did you, in fact, consult a doctor?
A. I consulted two physicians and they both said,
in effect, the same basic thing, which I knew
anyway. You can't do this.

Q. And those doctors were who?
A. First one was Dr. Jones. He referred me to
Dr. Spence.

Q. And Dr. Spence-what is his first name?
A. Robert Jones.
Q. Robert Jones, and who, then, is Dr. Spence?

A. First initial is "\V. I am not familiar with
his first name. Definitive treatments were
carried out for two month, and when that
was finished, in December, as I recall, the
question came to my mind, well, now, is this
going to happen again and I was advised
again not to start pushing again. Any_thing
can happen. If you want to have trouble
again, just go back and carry on and do too
much, and I was again advised, and it w_as
stressed, and they put it into strong terms
that this kind of activity ... (R-331, L2)

Q. But those doctors are here in town and available to be called if necessary, is that right?

A. They are.
Q. Well, Dr. Felt, in your professional work, is
it professionally advisable in your opinion
to carry on the type of work load you did in
'68 and '69? (R-332, L 25)
11

A. My answer would be no. It is not advisable.
(R-333, L 5)

Q. So the general advice was, you slow down!
A. Yes. (R-379, L 16).
In addition to his personal and health problems,
Dr. Felt had suffered a drastic price-cost squeeze with
gross overhead costs, according to schedules prepared
by a CPA firm, Exhibit 144-D (R-337, L 9) increas·
ing from $38,000.00 in 1967 to $43,000.00 in 1969 (R·
336, L 23) Exhibit 14-D and 16-B, gross income down
from $70,108.00 in 1967 to $67,648.00 in 1969, Exhibit
14-D, adjusted gross income down $34,040.00 in 1967
to $38,187.00 in 1968 and $28,014.00 in 1969, Exhibit
14-D and net income after taxes, etc., down from $17,·
317.00 in 1967, $17,573.00 in 1968 to $14,395.00 in
1969, Exhibit 14-D and 15-DQ. And your final net income, there is a trend
downward, is there not?

A. That's right.
Q. From $17,000. to $14,000. Is that correct?

A. Yes. (R-336, L 25)
Specific cost items testified to, more drastically
demonstrated the cost-price squeeze. Seminars and
meetings, by stipulation ( R-341, L 17) necessary in
this doctor's field, rose drastically upward in costs. (Ex.
17-D); insurance 1967 to 1970, $311.00 to $1,286.00,
(R-343, L 29) Exhibit 21-B; base telephone $33.00 to
$87.00; labor and billing costs, with the same office and
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fee set-up ( R-330, L 15) $465.00 to $900.00; auto insurance $136.00 to $207.00; meetings and seminars
$U62.00 to $3250.00 (R-344, L 22) Exhibit 21-D; rent
$240.00 to $280.00.
Remariage and support of a fatherless child increased defendant-husband's family and personal expenses substantially. This was conceded and that personal and living expenses would be drastically higher,
albeit applicable to both parties, (R-345, L 21 and L
28).

To October 1, 1970, defendant had paid alimony
of $30,543.83 ( R-386, L 21). 'Vhen the relief given at
court, a reduction was made conditional upon payment
of back alimony, he raised and paid the same (R-209),
$13,923.67, with $1,000.00 per month accruing through
May, 1971, ( R-211 )-a total of $48,000.00 plus interest
(R-206) plus costs (R-196), plus attorney's fees (R207, etc., etc., and only then was confronted with this
appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AND NECESSARILY
C 0 M P AR ED CONDITIONS
THEN, i.e., AT TIME OF DIVORCE, AND NO'V
IN REDUCING ALIMONY.
An alimony award is never quite final, but always
subject to review and modification for good cause
and changed circumstances.
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..,
If there is any factor well established in the Utan
law respecting alimony, it is that the alimony decree
is always subject to review for good cause shown.

In an early land mark case, Buzzo vs. Buzzo, 4j
Utah 625, 148 Pac. 362, where original alimony was
reduced without the wife's consent, she contending it was
unchangeable being a consent decree and not only tied
to a property settlement but payable out of real prop.
erty, Judge Frick ably wrote:
"We have a statute (Comp. Laws 1907, section
1212) which provides that in case a divorce is
granted the district courts of this state shall have
the power to make such orders in relation to 'the
children, property, parties, and the maintenance
of the parties and children as shall be equitable.'
It is further provided that 'subsequent changes
may be made by the court in respect to the disposal of children or the distribution of property,
as shall be reasonable and proper.' Waiving, for
the purpose of this decision, the question of
whether under said statute the courts may modify
a decree for alimony wherein specific real prop·
erty is decreed to the wife, or where a fixed lump
sum is paid to her, yet where, as here, a sum is
named in the decree of divorce, which is made
payable monthly, all courts agree that, .un~er
statutes like ours, the courts upon the application
of either party have the power to change,. m.odify,
or revise such a decree, and whenever It IS sat·
isfactorily made to appear that the circumstances
and conditions of the parties, or one of them, hav.e
changed so that the amount originally allowe~ is
no longer .Just or equitable, the court may modify
the same." (Citing many cases, New Hamp·
shire, Wisconsin, California,) (emphasis added)·
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The court further said:
"'i\T e are ~f the opinion, however, that every decree of divorce and alimony must be deemed
to have been entered subject to the provisions
of section 1212, (predecessor of current code provision)

All courts agree that if it is provided in the
decree itself, that it may be modified or revised
in case the circumstances and conditions of the
parties have materially changed the modification
may then be made .... Now, we think that under
statutes like ours the provision therein contained
authorizing a change in modification, is as much
a part of the decree as though it were written
into it. (Emphasis added).
As if to emphasize the appropriateness of review
in these matters, the alimony statute, 30-3-5, Utah Code
Annotated, which, prior to the 1969 Amendment, read
as follows:
"Disposition of property and children. - When
a decree of divorce is made the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property
and parties, and the maintenance of the parties
and children, as may be equitable; provided, that
if any of the children have attained the age of
ten years and are of sound mind, such children
shall have the privilege of selecting the parent
to which they will attach themselves. Such subsequent changes or new orders may be made by
the court with respect to the disposal of the children or the distribution of property as shall be
reasonable and proper.
was, by said amendment, changed to read as follows:

15

"Disposition of property and children. - When
a decree of divorce is made the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property
and partie_s, and the maintenance of the partie1
and children, as may be equitable. 1.'he court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to rnake such sub.
sequent changes or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the property as
shall be reasonable and necessary. (Emphasis
added),
the underlined words "The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make . . . " being added. Granted
the change was unnecessary as to continuing jurisdiction, our court having continuously and consistently,
from the earlie~t cases reiterated the proposition. Whitmore vs. Har<ling, 3 Utah 121, 1 Pac. 465; Reid vs.
Reid, 28 Utah 297, 78 Pac. 675.
In all of the alimony modification cases reviewed
by this writer, when the modification was sustained by
the appellate court, the method used by the trier of the
fact, the trial judge, was similar to that used in the
instant case, i.e., a review of the situation at time of
divorce as against the circumstances of parties at time
of motion for modification. Many of the reviews were
exhaustive as in the instant case and as indicated in
the Slaughter v. Slaughter case 18 Utah 2d 274, 421
P .2d 503, indeed, the trial court is obligated to inquire
and review and familiarize itself with the circumstances
(then and now) , otherwise, how else could he determine
what is "just and equitable" at a given time?
16

Indeed, the pattern of our Supreme Court is to
aff lfm drastic revisions respecting alimony and support
where the record indicates that the review is thorough
and that the trial court rendered its modification based
on a thorough understanding of all factors. This was
illustrated by Harri.son vs. Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180,
450 Pac. 2d 456, where the Supreme Court affirmed
a drastic revision upward in alimony and three years
after the divorce decree split up a $10,000.00 bank account.

Gallegos vs. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 Pac.

2d 30, albeit not a modification case but an ordinary
appeal, comments on the latitude of the trial court-

"' ... Due to the perrogatives and the advantaged
position of the trial judge, he has a comparatively wide latitude of discretion in determining
the rights and duties of the parties to a divorce
in order to provide the most equitable and practical basis for them to readjust their lives in as
happy and useful manner as possible.... This
judgment should not be upset unless it appears
that it works such an inequity or injustice, or
places one of the parties in such an impractical
situation that equit,Y and good conscience demand
that it be revised. We are not persuaded that he
abused the discretion which is reposed in him in
such matters."
In Slaughter vs. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421, P.2d
.503 (alimony appeal affirmed), this court commented
on the type of review carried on by the trial court saymg-
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" . . . It is our impression that the trial courl
h.as given consc~entious and judicious consider11•
tzon to the various factors appropriate to con.
sider in such situations and has entered the de.
cree which he deems just and equitable in the
circumstances. See Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utan
2d 79, 296 P.2d 977; MacDonald v. MacDonala.
120 Utah 573, 236 P 2d 1066; Habbeshaw ,:
Habbeshaw, 17 Utah 2d 285, 409 P 2d 972. We
are not persuaded that he abused the broad dfa.
cretion which is reposed in him in such matters.
(Emphasis added).

In the Whitmore vs. Harding case, 3 Utah 121, J
Pac. 465, the court reviewed the eccleastical, chancery
and legislative history of divorce and affirmed the con·
tinuing right of reviews of the then Third Districl
Court over the previous decision of the then Probate
Court citing the Territorial Statute Comp. Laws of
1852, Sec. 6, as providing, among other things"When a divorce is decreed, the court shall make
such order in relation to the children and prop·
erty of the parties and the maintenance of the
wife and such portion of the children as shall
be awarded to her, as may be just and equitable
... provided further, that when it shall appear
to the court at a, future time that it would be for
the interest of the parties concerned that a change
should be effected in regard to the former dis·
posal of children or distribution of property,
the court shall have power to make such change
as will be conducive to the best interests of all
parties concerned." Section 3 of 'An act in rela·
tion to guardians,' also in force at that time, pro·
vides: 'When a divorce is decreed or obtained.
such order in relation to the children and prop·
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erty of the parties, and the maintenance of the
wife, may be made as shall be deemed right and
proper; subsequent changes may be made by the
probate court or selectmen in those respects when
circumstances render them expedient." (Emphasis added) .
In Reid vs. Reid, 28 Utah 297, 78 Pac. 675, the
Court cited and relied on the 'Vhitmore case emphasizing that the trial court's action would not be set aside
except for abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial
court's decision and commented-

"Should appellant be thrown out of employment,
or for any legitimate reason be unable to pay the
amount now fixed by the court, the court may,
in the exercise of its own judicial discretion under Section 1212 Rev. St. 1898 make such order
in the premises as will be just and equitable to
both parties."
The term "just and equitable" and the authority
of the court on modification to make such changes as
are just and equitable under the circumstances, the language used in the memorandum decision herein, is consistently and repeatedly found in a review of the Utah
alimony medification cases.
In commenting upon the retention of jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court made an interesting comment in
Bott vs. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329 437 Pac. 2d 684, as follows:
" ... Under our statutes, the court retains jurisdiction of the parties to modify the decree with
respect to the distribution of the property. Sec-
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tion 30-3-5 UCA 1953, Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utafi
200, 158 Pac. 781. Especially should this be tru1
where the parties volnntarily litigate a matter
over which the court has jurisdiction." (Empha.
sis added.)
" ( 1-4) In reviewing the trial court's order in dJ.
vorce proceedings there are certain well estao.
lished principles to be borne in mind. The find.
ings and order are endowed with a prcsumptio1
of validity, and the burden is upon the appelum!
to show they are in error. Even though our con.
stitutional provision, Section 9 of Article VIIJ,
states that in equity cases this court may review
the facts, we nevertheless take into account the
advantaged position of the trial judge. Accord·
ingly, we recognize that it is his prerogative h1
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in
case of conflict, we assume that the trial court
believed the evidence which supports the findings.
We review the whole evidence in the light mosl
favorable to them; and we will not disturb them
merely because this court might have viewed the
matter differently, but only if the evidence clear·
ly preponderates against the findings.
1

( 5) For similar reasons, the trial court is al·
lowed a comparatively wide latitude of discre·
tion in determining what order should be made
in such matters; and we will not upset his judg·
ment and substitute our own unless it clear/,lf
appears that the trial court abused its discretion
or misapplied the law. The following are a few
examples of innumerable cases supporting tht
principles just stated: Slaughter v. Slaughter,
18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503; Dahlberg v. Dalu
berg, 77 Utah 157, 92 P.2d 214; Hendricks r
Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, G3 P.2d 277; Anderson
20

Y. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252; Allen
v. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872; Alldredge
v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681, 34
A.L.R.2d 305 ( 1951); Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah
255, P.2d 265. (Emphasis added).

In Whitehead v. Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397
P. 2d 987, (alimony appeal, affirmed), this court reiterated-
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"Due to the prerogatives reposed in him under
the law and to his advantaged position, the trial
judge must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude
of discretion in such matters, and his judgment
should not be changed lightly, nor at all unless
under the fact shown by the evidence it works
a manifest inequity or injustice."
If ever a court performed necessary surgery after
exhaustive search and discovery, and effected a necessary modification in the interest of equity and justice,
it is in the instant case.

POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGED CONDITIONS.
A. WIFE'S GOOD HEALTH, HIGH EARNINGS, ADMITTED LACK OF NEED, INVESTMENT POSITION, UTILIZATION OF
EDUCATION AND TRAINING WARRANTED REDUCTION.
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Plaintiff argues that events specifically contem
plated by the parties in the divorce decree cannot war
rant change in alimony. In the first place the change,
that have taken place could not have been contem.
plated. She was in poor health at the time of the divorct
and in vigorous health at the time of Motion to Reduct
alimony. Her income then was near non-existence ana
at the time of reduction, approximately $8,500.00 pe1
year plus the alimony plus consultation fees, plus invest.
ment income plus free lance advertising work. She wa1
unemployed at the time of the divorce decree and wi~
a bachelor's degree and therafter obtained extensin
training in television, radio advertising, etc,. volun·
tarily abandoned a dependent position and status anJ
became full time employed plus, vigorously utilizin1
her extensive education and training, hanging on to
the alimony only to save for the rainy day (R. 301 L.
12).
These changes could not have been contemplated at the
time of the decree.
Furthermore, the unwarranted language in the
decree seeking to divest the court of future jurisdiction
to change the same, with documents prepared by tht
plaintiff and only summarily read by defendant"A. Probably IO minutes to read it." (R-321
L 27)
could not divest the court of its power to exercise con·
tinuing jurisdiction. In Callister vs. Callister, I Utan
2d 34 261, Pac. 2nd 944, which was a proceeding In
modify a decree based on an agreement and proper!)
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settlement arrangement to provide alimony for life,
and in which the language was rather severe, the Court
held that it did not thereby lose its right to make such
modification or change thereafter as might be appropriate Lased on changed circumstances. The court said,
page 37:
"It is generally held that under such a statute
the court can modify a decree for alimony regardless of whether the decree was based upon
an agreement of the parties."

There the plaintiff was awarded $400.00 per month
during the life of the plaintiff or until her remarriage"
and certain property was divided. Several years later
plaintiff asked the court to reduce the alimony from
$400.00 to $200.00 per month, alleging reduced income,
$1,000.00 to $600.00 per month, health impairment, remarriage and a wife and child to support and necessity
to abstain from activities producing physical or mental
strain; also, the plaintiff, on the other hand, had rental
income and income from investments and stocks and
the trial court's modification was affirmed.
In that case, the plaintiff, seeking to sustain the
position that the alimony for life provision was a part
of a property settlement division and, therefore, untouchable in the future by the court cited various nonUtah decisions including California decisions respecting
property settlement decrees. The Utah Supreme Court,
in response, page 40, noted:
"A subsequent opinion by the Supreme Court
of California, Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605,
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160 P.2d 15, 18, clarifies and appears to set a!
rest the law of California relative to the issu
here under discussion. It quotes with appron\
the following from 39 Michigan Law Revie·
128:
'

'Assuming that the court has power by statuti
to modify a decree not based on contract, t
would seem that in the view of most courh
there is no sufficient reason to take the decret
based on contract out of the operation of tlie
statute as to the alimony provisions. That tnt
interest of the state in the marital status ana
the dissolution thereof is sufficient reason trJ
support such a view hardly reems to requirt
demonstration. * * * The obligation to par
alimony or support money to a divorced wift
is one peculiarly justified by considerations ol
social desirability and generally prescribed a1
a consequence to dissolution of the marital
relation. Being a continuing obligation, ano
being subject to scrutiny of the courts as to
fairness and adequacy at its inception, it shoula
so remain and the contract of the parties shoula
not be allowed to oust the court of power other·
wise exercisable.' ,, (Emphasis added).
1

The court in the Callister case further noted that
(as in the instant case) the property was a pproximatel1
equally divided and the alimony provision for life addea
There as in the instant case plaintiff contended the court
had erroneously reviewed the situation of parties anti
that the evidence did not support the trial court's Find·
1
ings nor Conclusions; however, this court found that ili
trier of the facts had properly reviewed income, worl
load, mental strain, income from stock and investrnenll
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etc., etc., etc., at the time of the divorce as against the
time of the application for modification, same as in the
instant case.
The general rule cited in plaintiff's brief, page 21,
attributable to 18 ALR 2d 10, is apparently not the
rule in Utah according to the Callister case where Judge
Hoyt wrote, page 38:
"This view (property settlement with monthly
payments for life not subsequently modifiable)
is opposed to the majority of appellant decisions
as appears from annotations in 18 ALR 1047,
1050, and 101 ALR 324, 326, and is not in harmony with views of this Court as announced in
Murphy vs. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010.
The Utah stafote at the time of that decision
was substantially the same as now. The court
said: 'This statute is broad and comprehensive
... and the court may afterwards, if occasion
shall require it, make such change in any decree
as 'will be conducive to the best interest of all
parties concerned.' "
And in Mathie vs. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 363
Pac. 2d 779, albeit not a modification case, this court
roundly held that,
"The parties cannot by contract completely defeat the authority expressly conferred upon the
court by our statutes, Sec. 30-3-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, in cases of divorce, to make
such orders in relation to property as may be
equitable.'' (Empasis added).
Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154, P. 952, cited
in plaintiff's brief, page 22 and page 10, is simply no
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help to plaintiff on any point, it merely decreeing tlrni·
alimony not initially granted cannot later be awardei
the wife at divorce having been denied alimony and Jileo
for alimony long after rendition of the decree.

Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P. 2d 1021.·
cited by plaintiff, page 22, is no assistance to plaintiffit does not hold that contemplated changes will not
warrant a modification. It simply found there was n1,
supbstantial change. The court (Judge Ruggeri)"Bear in mind that the burden of showing,
substantial change of circumstances is upon th1
defendant, the facts in the instant case failed tri
support the intervention of this court, and tn1
trial court's judgment is affirmed with costs tu
the plaintiff."
)
The Short v. Short case, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481, P.
2d 54, cited by plaintiff is a case where the trier of tht
facts, to whom we must give the benefit of the douot
in ferreting out the facts, found insufficient change ol
circumstances to warrant a modification. Mrs. Short
had been employed, was awarded $75.00 alimony anu
upon her going back to work, Mr. Short requested elimi·
nation of alimony.
The court found that she couldn't have contem·
plated living on a mere $7 5.00, therefore the fact ot
a subsequent salary did not warrant elimination of tbt
alimony.
In commenting on this case, the plaintiff's brie
fails to reveal that here the trial court, charged wiili

1
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responsibility, and given the latitude to pick and choose,
discover, weigh and determine, found inadequate
grounds to modify the decree, opposite from the instant
case. Also, unlike the instant case where exploration
was exhaustive, comparative procedures in the Short
case were so meager that the Supreme Court commented,
"There is the one point on appeal: that the court
erred in failing to compare the parties' present
circumstances in relation to those at the time of
the decree."

In the instant case, the plaintiff was sick, dependent,
only partially trained, earned meagerly from intermittent parttime work and lived high. At the time of the
application for reduction, she was full itme employed
and had income from freelance work plus consultation
fees plus investments, plus broadcasting company part
ownership and was in vigorous health, had taken on a
rather new way of life, had an income of close of nine
thousand dollars without alimony and over twenty thousand dollars with alimony, and did not really live "high"
so to speak but rather modestly, stashing the money
away for the rainy day. (R-301, L 12) where she commented:
" ... so I need this money to try to provide for
some kind of security if I am in an accident or
if I am out of work for a short amount of time
or even a long amount of time . . . "
The very definition of alimony contemplates maintenance and support-not the creation of an estate for
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retirement. See Hogland vs. Hogland, 19 Utah 103,.,
Pac. 20, where the court said:
"Alimony is defined to be an allowance whir
a husband, by order of court, pays to his wi/,
living separate from him, for her maintenance
That the complete change-over was voluntary
unquestioned:
Q. The fact remains that in 1968 you volu:
tarily worked in spite of $1,000.00 a moot
coming in?
A. (Mrs. Felt) I want to get enough ahead ili
we can forget this. (R-301, L 27)

Q. In 1969 you voluntarily worked, a~ I sa,
$7,000.00 odd dollars coming in - mor
money than most girls working in the busine·
world earned-you voluntarily worked an
earned another $9,000.00, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Apparently Mrs. Felt believes she must expedi
creation of an estate at Dr. Felt's expense, lest his heall
fail in the future.
Q. At the present time then, you are in vigoro\
health and fully employed and employa~.
and earning enough to sustain yourself. Wk
you are really working for is old ~ge in ili
future? That is what you are worried about
A. I can live from day to day if nothing gl'I
wrong.
Q. 'Vhy don't we eliminate this alimony tdrnt
such time as you are sick or unemploye '
unemployable?
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A. Maybe at that time Dr. Felt will be sick or
unemployed.

If Dr. Felt died she would receive $110,000.00 on
insurance plus double indemnity benefits if applicable.

n.

HUSBAND'S INCREASED COSTS, DECEASED NET EARNINGS, INCREASED
LIYING EXPENSES, AND OTHER FACTORS ARE GROUNDS FOR REDUCTION
OF ALIMONY.

As against her change over from a dependent, se!llitrained, intermittent part time working person to a consultant in her chosen field and in an investment position defendant-husband found himself in a serious costprice squeeze substantially reducing his net income
despite drasticaly increased personal and home expenses
and new responsibilities and in addition, found his
health seriously jeopardized with doctors warning him
to slow down or suffer the consequences, and he concluding he was prostituing his profession to maintain
the alimony. The circumstances drove him to seek medical and legal advice and relief from the equity arm of
this court. Thereupon the trier of the fact, with inches
of discovery material at its disposal and three days of
testimony, found-

" . . . By reason of a change of circumstances,
the court- has found that decree has become unjust and unreasonable." (R-472, L 18)
l\ erertheless, alimony was continued through eight
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more months from the hearing date, $8,000.00 more
then to be not eliminated, but reduced to $1.00.
In other words, she can still lean on him for tfi,
rainy day she is concerned about. And the court dii,
not disturb the life insurance benefits.
In the Sorense nvs. Sorensen case, 20 Utah 2d 3 0 ~
438 Pac. 2d 180, heavily relied upon by plaintiff, theri
was simply a failure of proof showing substantial change
This court (Judge Harding) in commenting, said:
"In regard to ( e) (adult daughter in home sinc1
married) there is no showing as to who furnisheo
the daughter's support in the mother's home or
who paid for whose schooling or other expensei
... As to ( f), no evidence was given or offereo
to show the amounts of income therefrom to sup·
port this ground. (Substantial improvement in
liquidity of wife's separate property).
Of note is this comment in the Sorensen case"The rules governing modification of the alimorn
portion of a divorce decree grants the trial cow:
the advantage of some discretion, since the parti~
are usually before the court and a sounder ap
praisal of the situation can be made ... "
POINT III
THE COURT MADE A NECESSARY ANf
WELL FOUNDED AND JUST REDUCTIO)
OF ALIMONY BASED ON EXHAUSTIVE IX
QUIRY INTO CONDITIONS THEN AND NO\I
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REVEALING MATERIAL CHANGE AND
UNFAIR ALIMONY UNDER CHANGED CONDITIONS.
A salient factor in this case is the voluntary placement by plaintiff of herself in the labor market in a
highly professional capacity, intimately trained with
two degrees.

It is important that her salary is high and that she
obtains consulting fees for advisory work and free lance
work. It is important that she has voluntarily chosen a
modest way of living, investing and saving for security
purposes. She is in vigorous health, participating in all
activities with broad social contacts. She admits she
does not need his helpto live on-only to save for the
future. She almost but not quite admitted that the alimony should be eliminatedQ. It is with reluctance you accept alimony?

A. I want it right now because I need it. I don't
like it. I wish I didn.'t have to.
Q. 'Vhy not eliminate alimony until such time
as you are sick, unemployed or unemployable?
Mr. Burton: I object to that question. It's not
relevant. (R-3044, L 15).

*

*

*

Q. 'Vhy don't we eliminate this alimony until
such time as you are sick or unemployed or
unemployable?

A. Maybe at that time Dr. Felt will be sick or
unemployed. ( R-303, L 2) .

31

It is apparent from the marriage settlement agret
ment that counsel involved mistakenly assumed she ha,1
put him through college but the record completely dil
pells that theory. Also, the writer of the decree over
stepped in trying to divest the court of future inheren:
statutory alimony review authority and it is an elemen
tary rule of construction that documents should be inter
preted most severely against those who produced anc
wrote them. It is salient that defendant tried valiantl1
to keep up the alimony but failed finding it no longe1
possible. (R-329, L 21), "physically and mentally im
possible." ( R-330, L 9)

We cannot help but be impressed by the evidencr
indicating" Patients who are not used to being rushea
through in half the time ... " ( R-330, L 23)
"The surgical schedule was more crowded ano
when I got home at night I was so tired, and I
mean it, that I fell in front of the dinner ta bk
and from there into bed, kicking everything aloni
the way ... " (R-331, L 8)
"And later that year, in spite of this type ol
schedule, as you know, I developed some neuro·
logical problems." (R-331, L 15.)
Defendant sought medical help and was told to slow
downA. I consulted two physicians and they both saiil
in effect the same basic thing which I knew
anyway. You can't do this ...
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... treatments were carried on for two months
and then when that was finished, I was advised
again not to start pushing again. ( R-332, L IO)
'Vith the fee schedule remaining substantially the
same (R-330, L 15) and overhead costs higher, many
of them drastically-Exhibit 21-D and Exhibit 17-D)
with gross income actually decreasing (Exhibit 14-D),
and net income drastically reduced (Exhibit 14-D; also
tax returns), and these facts are not in dispute whatsoever, we cannot question the substance of the change
in defendant-husband's circumstances as concluded by
the trier of the facts.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's inquiry was rather exhaustive. 'iVe
cannot deny that it must have provided a broad acquaintance with the situation of parties at time of the divorce
and at time of application for modification. The court
found the $1,000.00 per month alimony no longer just,
necessary or equitable. We are only left to inquire if
the record viewed in light most favorable to defendanthusband sustains the finding. The respective situations,
then and now, of parties, was weighed-health, training,
education, income, investment situation, overhead costs,
tax obligations, etc.-and the pre-trial discovery was
mountainous.
'Ve submit that the changes in the situation of
either party warranted a reduction in alimony and that
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the combined changes and fairness to parties compel
the modification arrived at.
Respectfully submitted,
GAYLE DEAN HUNT
Attorney for DefendantRespondent-H us band
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